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The Effect of Constitutional Hermeneutics on
Whether Warrantless Thermal Imaging Is an
Impermissible Search under the Fourth Amendment
INTRODUCTION
It was December 1991.1 Narcotics Agent Charles West of the
Alabama Department of Public Safety learned that Theodore
Robinson had recently received a shipment of thirty high-pressure
sodium lights.2  Suspecting that Robinson might be growing
marijuana in his house, Agent West began to investigate. 3 He
discovered that Robinson had ordered similar lights and hydroponic
equipment twice in the previous two years.4 Agent West also
learned that Robinson's electric bill was four times the average
electric bill for houses in his neighborhood. 5 Additionally, Robinson
had paid for the sodium lights with a cashier's check for $7,000,
although he had not filed an income tax return with the Alabama
Department of Revenue. 6
Finally, Agent West ordered a Forward Looking Infrared Receiver
("FUR") thermal examination of Robinson's home.7 To accomplish
this, a helicopter flew overhead during the night to record the heat
signatures emanating from Robinson's and his neighbors' houses.8
The thermal imaging indicated that Robinson's house was much
warmer than his neighbors'. 9
Armed with this information, Agent West obtained and executed
a search warrant. 10 Discovering Robinson's marijuana crop, he
1. United States v. Robinson, 62 F3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 1995).
2. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1327. High pressure sodium lights are flourescent lamps of an
"unprecedented lighting power." Electric Lighting, MICRosoFr ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA (1996).




7. Id. FUR thermal imaging is a process in which differences in heat emissions are
measured and recorded on videotape. Heat concentration is indicated on a spectrum of light
to dark, with bright white representing intense heat. Increasingly, law enforcement personnel
are using FIER thermal imaging to detect indoor marijuana growing operations. Id. at 1327
n.2.
8. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1327.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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confiscated the marijuana, the lights, and the hydroponic
equipment."
At a suppression hearing before the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama, Robinson contended that the
warrantless thermal imaging was a "search," and thus, violated the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 12 Both the
district court and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit disagreed, citing a number of other courts that had
held warrantless thermal imaging permissible under the Fourth
Amendment. 3 Not all courts agree with the Eleventh Circuit,
however. In fact, several jurisdictions insist that warrantless
thermal imaging is unconstitutional. Why do courts differ on this
matter? The answer lies in the field of constitutional
hermeneutics.14
CONSTITUTIONAL HERMENEUTICS
Establishing a method of interpretation is a vital step toward
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1328. The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1328, 1330.
14. "Hermeneutics" is the "theory or art of explication, of interpretation." SANFORD
LEVINSON & STEVEN MAIILOUX, INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERmENEUTc READER ix
(1988). The term "legal hermeneutics" refers to "the systematic body of rules which are
recognized as applicable to the construction and interpretation of legal writings." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 727 (6th ed. 1990). The discipline is generally unknown to outsiders and has
"long maintained the status of an 'auxiliary discipline' within the established disciplines that
concerned themselves with interpreting texts or signs." JEAN GRONDIN, INTRODUCTION To
PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 1 (1994).
Hermeneutics emerged during the Renaissance to aid the disciplines of theology,
philosophy, and law, in particular. Id. The reason for the rise of hermeneutics is, quite
simply, that differing methods of interpretation result in different meanings. See generaUy
GRONDIN, supra, at 41. Hence, to avoid arbitrary interpretations, the disciplines of law,
theology, and philosophy set about establishing their hermeneutical theories.
The Protestant reformer, Martin Luther, is credited with initiating the discipline of
hermeneutics. Id. at 39. Following Luther, Protestants such as Flacius Illyricus, John Calvin,
Frederick Schleiermacher, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Rudolf Bultmann forged various theories of
hermeneutics. Id. The three disciplines (law, philosophy, and theology) all influenced each
other in the development of hermeneutics. The Reformers' theory of sola scriptura is
comparable to the legal theory of textualism, while modern philosophical theories of
deconstructionism and pragmatism influenced the legal theories that are pragmatic and
non-textual. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL. FAITH 27-53 (1988); see also LEVINSON &
MAILLOUX, supra, at x-xiii.
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obtaining substantive knowledge in a given discipline. A
philosopher determines his epistemology before venturing into
metaphysics,15 and a theologian determines his hermeneutic before
setting forth his doctrine. 16 The hermeneutic used determines the
knowledge obtained. Accordingly, the legal hermeneutic employed
by a court determines its conclusions of law.
In its constitutional jurisprudence, the United States Supreme
Court has used several methods of interpretation. These methods
can be divided into three broad categories: textualism,
non-textualism, and a hybrid approach. 17 The central tenet of
15. "Metaphysics" is a "subdivision of philosophy that involves a critical study of the
nature of reality." STANLEY M. HONER, THOMAS C. HuNT & DENNIS L. OKHoLM, INVITATION TO
PHILOSOPHY 235 (1992).
"Epistemology" is a "subdivision of philosophy that studies the nature, the sources, the
possibilities, the limitations, and the validity of knowledge." Id. at 231. The philosopher asks
how he knows before he asks what he knows. Prior to the English empiricist John Locke,
epistemology did not loom over the entire discipline of philosophy as it has for the last two
centuries. Locke's book, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, was the first
philosophical work to make the scope and nature of human knowledge its central focus. 5
FREDERICK COPLESTON, THE BRITISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM HOBBES To HUME: A HISTORY OF
PHILOSOPHY 71 (1959).
Of course, Immanuel Kant's influence "led to this branch of philosophical inquiry usurping
to all intents and purposes the whole field of philosophy; that is to say, among those
thinkers who adhered more or less closely to the position of Kant himself." Id. at 71. George
Berkley, David Hume, J.S. Mill, G.E. Moore, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Bertrand Russell are
other notable philosophers who dealt with epistemology.
16. The theologian will ask how he is to know divine revelation before he inquires into
what is revealed. Protestants employ one of two methods: textualism or mythological
interpretation; Roman Catholics employ a method in which Church tradition interprets the
text. LEVINSON, CONSrIuTIONAL FArr, supra note 14, at 27-53.
17. Various terms have been used to describe these two categories: "interpretivism. and
non-interpretivism" (see CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, How TO READ THE CONSTITUTION: ORIGINALISM,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, AND JUDIcIAL REVIEw (1996)); "orginalism and non-orginalism"
(see PAUL BREST, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, INTERPRETING LAW
AND LrrIERATURE 69 (1988)); "textualism and non-textualism" (see ANTONIN SCALA ET AL., A
MATrER OF INTERPRETATION 23 (Amy Gutmann, ed., 1997)); Protestant and Catholic (see
LEVINSON, supra note 14, at 27-53) (arguing that textualism is similar to Protestant
hermeneutics and non-textualism is similar to Roman Catholic hermeneutics). "Textualism"
and "non-textualism" are used in this paper because they place the focus on the courts'
treatment of the text of the Fourth Amendment when interpreting it. See Thomas C. Grey,.
The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L REv. 1 (1984), stating:
It is common to call the opposing schools of thought on the question 'interpretivist'
and 'noninterpretivist,' but this distorts the debate. If the current interest in
interpretive theory, or hermeneutics, does nothing else, at least it shows that the
concept of interpretation is broad enough to encompass any plausible mode of
constitutional adjudication. We are all interpretivists; the real arguments are not over
whether judges should stick to interpreting, but over what they should interpret and
what interpretive attitudes they should adopt. Repenting of past errors, I will therefore
use the less misleading labels textualists' and 'supplements' for, respectively, those
who consider the text the sole legitimate source of operative norms in constitutional
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textualism is that the text determines the law. There are three
types of textualism. First is "grammatical" textualism.'8 This
method relies exclusively upon the words of a particular
constitutional provision to understand that provision.19  No
reference is made to anything outside the text. Furthermore, the
text is construed in a narrow and literal fashion, although the
context and history might suggest a broader reading.20 The second
type of textualism is historical textualism. 21 Using this method, the
interpreter examines the history surrounding the text of a
provision, including its legislative history, to determine what result
Congress expected the provision to achieve. 22 The third type of
textualism takes the middle road: "grammatical-historical"
textualism.2 This method examines the language of the provision,
in light of historical sources, if necessary, to determine what the
adjudication, and those who accept supplementary sources of constitutional law.
Id. at 1.
18. This is also known as "strict" or "literal" textualism. ScALA, supra note 17, at 23.
19. One tool of the grammatical textualist is a variant of the "plain meaning" rule.
BREsT, supra note 17, at 71. The "plain meaning" rule holds that the meaning of a text is "the
meaning it would have for a 'normal speaker of English' under the circumstances in which it
is used." Id. The strict (or literal) textualist would omit the phrase "under the circumstances
in which it is used" from the definition of the plain meaning rule. In other words, the literal
textualist imposes the current English-language meaning on the text, irrespective of when
the text was written.
20. Justice Scalia distinguishes between "literal construction" and "reasonable
construction":
Take for example, the provision of the First Amendment that forbids abridgment of
the 'freedom of speech, or of the press.' That phrase does not list the full range of
communicative expression. Handwritten letters, for example, are neither speech nor
press. Yet surely there is no doubt they cannot be censored. In this constitutional
context, speech and press, the two most common forms of communication, stand as a
sort of synecdoche for the whole. This is not strict construction, but it is reasonable
construction.
ScAmA, supra note 17, at 37-38. Note also that Martin Luther, a forerunner of textualism in
his method of sola scriptura, distinguished between being a literalist and being
literal-minded. GERALD L. BRUNS, HERMENEUTICS ANCIENT AND MODERN 144 (1992). Luther
acknowledged that the "Bible is often literally figurative in its language, as anyone who
knows how to read can see." Id. One who is literal-minded would interpret an obviously
figurative passage in a wooden, literal manner. Justice Scalia does not advocate this kind of
"grammatical textualism." ScAu, supra note 17, at 37-38.
21. This is also known as "expectation originalism." ScAu4A, supra note 17, at 119.
22. Id. at 119-27, 144-49.
23. Grammatical-historical textualism is the predominant form of textualism advocated
by textualists, e.g., Justice Scalia and Judge Robert Bork. The phrase, "gramatical, historical"
can be traced as far back as Martin Luther who wrote that the term, "'literal meaning,' is not
a good term ... [rather] [tIhose who call it 'grammatical, historical meaning' do better."
BRUNS, supra note 20, at 44.
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text itself says.24 This hermeneutic is not concerned with what the
author of the provision meant to say or with what he meant to
achieve by enacting the provision; rather, grammatical-historical
textualism is solely concerned with what the text says the law is. 25
Thus, a reasonable construction is sought, avoiding both the
narrow and broad constructions.
2 6
Non-textualism can be divided into two categories. The first,
"formalism," (which is now defunct), was essentially a rationalistic
system used during the nineteenth century and early twentieth
century.2 7  Law was a comprehensive and coherent corpus
"discovered"2 by the court from various sources: natural law,2 the
24. Quite simply, "original understanding is thus manifested in the words used and in
secondary materials, such as debates at conventions, public discussions, newspaper articles,
dictionaries in use at the time, and the like." ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 144
(1990). This is also known as the "plain meaning" rule, supra note 19. Professor Wolfe
argues that grammatical-historical textualism was the dominant hermeneutic during the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Wolfe cites Justice Marshall's opinion in Ogden v.
Saunders as providing a summary of early hermeneutics:
To say that the intention of the instrument must prevail; that this intention must be
collected from the words; that its words are to be understood in that sense in which
they are generally used by those for whom the instrument was intended; that its
provisions are neither to be restricted to insignificance [grammatical textualism], nor
extended to objects not comprehended in them, nor contemplated by its framers
[non-textualism]; is to repeat what has been already said more at large, and is all that
can be necessary.
WOLFE, supra note 17, at 6 (citing Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 250 (1827)
(Marshall, C.J., dissenting)). Wolfe noted that the framers subordinated extrinsic evidence of
intent (namely, historical sources) to the document itself. Id. at 7.
25. There is a fine line between using history to determine what the words of a text
mean and using history to determine the purpose of the law. Justice Scalia rejects the use of
legislative history entirely, on the grounds that it fails to aid in understanding the meaning of
the text. ScAIA, supra note 17, at 29-37. Scalia also maintains that courts use legislative
history to determine what the legislature intended, as opposed to what the text of the statute
accomplishes. Id.
26. ScAIA, supra note 17, at 23.
27. Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment
Theory, 41 U.C.LA L REV. 199, 215-16 (1993).
28. The term "discovered" is significant. Formalism was predicated on the assumption
that the Law is eternal and immutable; accordingly, a court did not make law; rather, it
discovered law. Cloud, supra note 27, at 216-17.
29. The term "natural law" is defined as:
a system of rules and principles for the guidance of human conduct which,
independently of enacted law or of the systems peculiar to any one people, might be
discovered by the rational intelligence of man, and would be found to grow out of and
conform to his nature, meaning by that word his whole mental, moral, and physical
constitution. The point of departure for this conception was the Stoic doctrine of life
ordered 'according to nature,' which in its turn rested upon the purely suppositious
existence, in primitive times, of a 'state of nature'; that is, a condition of society in
which men universally were governed solely by a rational and consistent obedience to
the needs, impulses, and promptings of their true nature, such nature being as yet
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Constitution, and common law.30 Using deductive reasoning, the
court applied the Law to particular cases to determine the proper
outcome. 3'
"Pragmatism," the second category of non-textualism, replaced
formalism early in this century.32 Legal pragmatism teaches that
consequences determine the law.a3 Law is an instrument used by
courts to achieve social goals; it is not an a priori principle that
determines the resolution of particular disputes without regard to
social goals.3 This instrumentalism rejects any notion of an eternal
immutable law.
35
The final method of interpretation, "metatextualism," is a hybrid
of textualism and non-textualism.36  Under the metatextual
approach, the interpreter considers the meaning of the text, its
history, and the expectations of the authors.37 Then the interpreter
looks beyond the text to consider social and policy reasons for
deciding what the law should be.38
undefaced by dishonesty, falsehood, or indulgence of the baser passions....
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1026 (6th ed. 1990). British empiricist, John Locke, who influenced
the philosophical thought of the Framers (See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and
Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L REV. 1449-52 (1990)
(describing the influence John Locke had on Founding Father Thomas Jefferson)), defined
natural law as "a universally obligatory moral law promulgated by the human reason as it
reflects on God and His rights, on man's relation to God and on the fundamental equality of
all men as rational creatures." COPLESTON, supra note 15, at 129.
30. Cloud, supra note 27, at 216.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 215.
33. Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy,
Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 568 (1996).
34. Cloud, supra note 27, at 210 & 216.
35. Id. at 209. Professor Cloud notes, "A central tenet of legal pragmatism is a
renunciation of foundational theories. Law is not some idealized 'brooding omnipresence,'
not some abstraction whose meaning awaits discovery; it is something that judges, lawyers,
and legislators make. Law should not be treated as the product of immutable principles; it
should be viewed instrumentally, as a tool to be used to achieve social or policy goals." Id.
at 209-10. The concept of historicism buttresses pragmatism's rejection of absolute values;
historicism maintains that "all human knowledge is decisively conditioned and shaped by the
circumstances of the observer." WOLFE, supra note 17, at 162. Thus, "[h]uman beings never
get beyond their own somewhat distorted perceptions to reality itself." Id.
36. Professor Grey identifies this hybrid as "supplementalism." Grey, supra note 17, at
1. This term serves only to describe part of the interpretive process employed by those using
a hybrid method. A pragmatist analysis supplements a textual analysis; the interpreter is
going beyond the text to consider policy reasons. Hence, an appropriate appellation would
be "metatextualism." This is the term that will be used to describe the hybrid hermeneutic.
37. Grey, supra note 17, at 23.
38. Id.
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FOURTH AMENDMENT SURVEILLANCE JURISPRUDENCE
Courts place thermal imaging cases within the category of
surveillance cases. Consequently, in warrantless thermal imaging
cases, courts have adopted the hermeneutic employed by the
Supreme Court in Fourth Amendment surveillance cases. Thus,
examination of those Supreme Court cases provides a context for
understanding the conflict among lower courts over the issue of
warrantless thermal imaging.
Olmstead v. United States began the Supreme Court's
surveillance jurisprudence. 39 From the perspective of constitutional
hermeneutics, Olmstead is important because it illustrates the
convergence of formalism, textualism, and pragmatism. 40  In
Olmstead, the Court inquired whether a search to obtain
information by tapping into telephone wires without actually
trespassing onto the defendant's property was unreasonable. 4' The
majority began its analysis by reviewing case history.42 Cases cited
by the majority used a formalist hermeneutic to give the Fourth
Amendment a meaning more expansive than its text.4 The majority
39. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Referring to surveillance cases, Professor Telford Taylor states,
"In this field, as you all know, the law takes off from the Olmstead case, decided in 1928."
TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUrIONAL INTERPRETATION 71 (1969).
40. Professor Cloud identifies Olmstead as "the deathknell for a critical part of the
formalist construct - the integration of property law with an expansive interpretation of
constitutional provisions designed to protect individual liberty... " Cloud, supra note 33, at
609.
41. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455.
42. Id. at 458.
43. Id. at 458-64. Professor Cloud examines several of these formalist cases. In Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Supreme Court "adopted an expansive, structural
theory in which the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were linked by principles of privacy,
property, and liberty." Cloud, supra note 33, at 576. Cloud further explains the significance
of this expansive reading:
First, these rights were indefeasible. This is the language of strong fundamental rights
- rights that trump social policies, including the goals favored by political majorities
and their elected representatives in the executive and legislative branches. Indeed,
these rights are so strong that the Constitution prohibits the most minimal
transgressions against them, as well as the most severe. Second, these rights are
indefeasible not only because the fundamental constitutional text defines them, but
also because they are natural rights that are embodied in the Bill of Rights. Finally,
these rights work in harmony, defining and amplifying one another.
Id. Professor Cloud states that in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the
exclusionary rule was not adopted for pragmatic reasons; rather, the Court adopted it for
formalist ones. The "principles of humanity and civil liberty" embodied in the Fourth (and
Fifth) Amendment required the Court "to enforce the Constitution's restraints upon the
exercise of government power. . . ." Cloud, supra note 33, at 587-88. Finally, Professor
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limited any further expansion, however, by stating that the
Amendment restricted the meaning of "search" to material things."
Thus, the Supreme Court held that wiretapping without trespassing
onto the defendant's property is not a search of a material thing.45
In his dissent, Justice Brandeis advocated a non-textual
pragmatic approach." He stated that the language of the Fourth
Amendment should not be rigid and inflexible; rather, it should be
amenable to the social and technological development of society.
47
Justice Brandeis formulated an argument often echoed by lower
courts in their opposition to warrantless thermal imaging of homes
- the "technological slippery slope."4" He cautioned that as
technology develops, a person will be able to pry into the deepest,
darkest, and most private corners of another person's life. Thus, to
avoid the risk of total exposure of a citizen's life, Justice Brandeis
stressed that the courts must read the Fourth Amendment as
protective of the individual's privacy interest.49
Katz v. United States,w°  decided nearly forty years after
Olmstead, represents the next significant step in Fourth
Amendment surveillance jurisprudence. 51  The Supreme Court
Cloud notes that Gouled v. United States "was the 'high water mark' of the theory linking
private property and an expansive vision of liberty based on indefeasible rights." Id. at 593
(citing Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), overruled by Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967)).
44. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464-65. Chief Justice Taft relied upon textualism rather than
formalism or pragmatism in his rationale.
45. Id. at 466.
46. Id. at 471.
47. Id. at 472-73.
48. Id. at 474. Justice Brandeis stated, "Ways may some day be developed by which the
government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court,
and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the
home." Id.
49. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478. Professor Cloud notes:
But it was Brandeis, not Holmes, who leveled the most powerful pragmatist
arguments against the revised formalism of the majority opinion. Brandeis' arguments
captured both the instrumental and contextual sides of pragmatist theory. Central to
his dissent was the idea of a living Constitution that adapted to a changing world and
whose meaning was not frozen at the moment of drafting: '"ime works changes,
brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital
must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.'
Cloud, supra note 33, at 614 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472-73 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
50. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
51. Professor Cloud notes that "[uIntil the 1960's the Court generally relied upon the
residue of the formalist linkage between property and privacy interests to resolve [the issue
of whether a search occurred]." Cloud, supra note 27, at 247 (citing Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
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rejected any semblance of formalism or textualism, adopting a
thoroughgoing pragmatism. The Katz Court addressed the
constitutionality of placing an electronic listening device on the
exterior of a phone booth to record a defendant's phone
conversation. 2 Rather than asking whether the text of the Fourth
Amendment prohibits the use of "bugs" in this circumstance, the
Court focused on the individual's expectation of privacy.53 The
Court noted that the issue of whether the conduct physically
invaded property protected by the Fourth Amendment was
irrelevant. To constitute a "Fourth Amendment search," the Court
held that the conduct must merely result in obtaining information
from one who manifests a subjective expectation of privacy.5 Also,
the information is such that society expects it to remain private.55
This "expectation of privacy" test grew out of a pragmatic
hermeneutic. The textual meaning of the Amendment is not
possible to know, and is, consequently, irrelevant. Therefore, the
desired social goal determines what the Amendment means. The
protection of "people, not places," from the intrusion of
government is the particular social goal articulated by the Katz
Court.56 In light of today's technology, recognizing society's
expectation of privacy and focusing on the interests of both the
individual defendant and those of the society-at-large (rather than
on the text of the Fourth Amendment) is the best way to achieve
that goal. Thus, without a warrant, a "bug" cannot be used to
monitor the telephone conversations of a person in a phone booth
who has an expectation of privacy.
57
Justice Black, an ardent textualist,5s dissented from the majority
opinion in Katz. Justice Black stated that the language of the
52. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348-49.
53. Id. at 349-50.
54. Id. at 351-59. Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, offered a test for unreasonable
searches that later became the accepted rule: "first that a person has exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Id. at 361.
55. Id. at 351-59.
56. Id. at 351.
57. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.
58. Professor Wolfe notes:
[Justice] Black, most scholars would admit, was an extremely eccentric originalist.
Anyone who reads the constitutional provision that representatives shall be elected
'by the People' as a textual command 'that as nearly as practicable one man's vote in
a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's' does not have strong
credentials as an originalist. Wellington's critique only shows that Black is a poor
'interpretivist.'
WOLFE, supra note 17, at 13940 (citing Wesbury v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)).
1998
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Fourth Amendment did not support the majority's interpretation
because the amendment was not organic in nature, and thus, not
able to expand and grow.59 Employing a textualist hermeneutic,
Justice Black argued that the Fourth Amendment plainly protects
"tangible things."6° Speech, however, is intangible and cannot be
searched or seized. Accordingly, Justice Black reasoned that "the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to eavesdropping."
6'
The Supreme Court's 1979 decision in Smith v. Maryland
demonstrates the use of a purely pragmatic hermeneutic. 62 The
Court addressed whether the use of a pen register63 is a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.64 Citing Katz as the
"lodestar," the Court explicitly employed Justice Harlan's
expectation of privacy test.65 In holding that the use of a pen
register does not constitute a search, the Court reasoned that the
phone company keeps records of phone numbers dialed, thus, a
person cannot expect those numbers to remain private.
66
In Oliver v. United States,7 the Supreme Court held that a
warrantless search of an open field does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. 8  Employing a metatextualist hermeneutic, the
majority reasoned that a person has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in an open field because neither the history nor the text of
the Fourth Amendment support such a conclusion.69 The dissent,
59. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 364-65.
60. Id. at 365. Justice Black argued that both clauses of the Fourth Amendment imply
the requirement of tangibility. "Persons, houses, papers and effects" are all things which are
spatial, i.e., having "size, form, and weight." Id. The second clause requires "a particular
description of the place, person or thing to be searched or seized." Id. Non-tangible things
cannot be so described or seized; therefore, they are not protected by the Fourth
Amendment. d.
61. Id. at 366. Justice Black's analysis of Olmstead emphasized that the Court's past
jurisprudence has read the language of the Fourth Amendment closely, to determine whether
a search occurred. In Olmstead, the Court found that the presence of physical trespass "was
not the determinative factor." Katz, 389 U.S. at 368.
62. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
63. A "pen register" is "a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a
telephone.... It does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls
are actually completed." Smith, 442 U.S. at 736 n.1 (citations omitted).
64. Smith, 442 U.S. at 739.
65. Id. at 73940.
66. Id. at 74142. In conducting its expectation of privacy analysis, the Court did not
consider the text of the Fourth Amendment or its history to determine the extent of a
search. Id. at 74246.
67. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
68. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181.
69. Id. at 178-81. Professor Cloud does not distinguish between a pragmatist who takes
cognizance of the text of the Fourth Amendment in the manner of a textualist and a pure
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on the other hand, argued for a pure pragmatist hermeneutic - an
expectation of privacy analysis that was not restricted by a
historical understanding of the Fourth Amendment.70 Furthermore,
the dissent argued that interpreting the Constitution in the same
way as a statute is an erroneous approach. 7' Rather, the dissent
focused on whether a fundamental human liberty was at stake.72 In
support of its argument, the. dissent noted that property rights are
loosely affiliated with privacy rights. 73 Thus, the Fourth Amendment
must protect the privacy of a person who posts "No Trespassing"
signs to keep his field private.74
United States v. Karo75 is a somewhat unusual case in that the
Supreme Court did not use Katz's pragmatic expectation of privacy
test. In Karo, the government, acting without a warrant, implanted
a beeper in a suspect's personal property to determine whether that
property was located in the person's home. Simple visual
observation could not have revealed whether the personal property
was within the person's home.7 The Court held that the monitoring
of the beeper was a "search" and violated the Fourth Amendment.
77
The Court provided only two rationales for its holding: first,
warrantless searches inside a home are presumed invalid; and
second, such monitoring of a person's property was too great a
threat to the Fourth Amendment's privacy interest to remain
unchecked. 78  Nowhere, however, did the Court cite Katz's
expectation of privacy test as the basis for its decision.
In California v. Ciraolo, the Supreme Court continued to waver
pragmatist who concerns himself only with policy justifications. Accordingly, Cloud's
explanation of why the majority did not find a "search" in Oliver is that it found society's
interest in privacy outweighed by the government's interest in law enforcement. Cloud, supra
note 27, at 255-56. While law enforcement may have been a concern of the Court (see Oliver,
466 U.S. at 181), the "plain language of the Fourth Amendment and its historical purposes"
were also concerns of the Court. Id. at 184. The Oliver Court used metatextualism in
reaching this conclusion.
70. Id. at 185-186.
71. Id. at 187.
72. Id. at 186.
73. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 190.
74. Id. at 195-96.
75. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
76. Karo, 468 U.S. at 707-14. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (holding
that the use of a beeper was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment when the personal
property could be observed visually all the way to its ultimate destination).
77. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714.
78. Id. at 715-17. The Court stated, "Indiscriminate monitoring of property that has
been withdrawn from public view would present far too serious a threat to privacy interests
in the home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight." Id.
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on the abandonment of formalism and textualism in analyzing
surveillance search issues.79 In Ciraolo, the Court addressed
whether an aerial surveillance of the defendant's backyard
constituted a search that violated the Fourth Amendment.8
°
Suspecting that the defendant was growing marijuana in his
backyard, but unable to see the yard because of a ten-foot fence
enclosing it, a police officer flew an airplane over the yard at an
altitude of 1,000 feet.8 ' The officer discovered marijuana, evidence
that the prosecutor used to convict Ciraolo.
82
Although the Ciraolo majority did not explicitly analyze the
language of the Fourth Amendment, it did rely on the history of the
Amendment to conclude that a non-physically-intrusive search does
not violate society's expectation of privacyY The Court focused on
the manner of surveillance, viewing the aerial surveillance in light
of the curtilage doctrine" The curtilage doctrine extended the
privacy traditionally associated with the home to the property
immediately surrounding the home.85 In the past, the Fourth
Amendment had not prevented law enforcement officers from
viewing anything in plain sight within the curtilage.8 6 The Ciraolo
Court reasoned that unmagnified observation from a height of 1,000
feet was sufficiently similar to walking along the street, and
therefore, permitted the search.
8 7
The curtilage doctrine arose out of the formalist hermeneutic in
cases like Boyd v. United States88 and Olmstead v. United States. 9
Thus, the curtilage doctrine embodied a hermeneutic alien to
pragmatism. Consequently, the dissent disagreed with the majority's
analysis.90 Refusing to "freeze" Fourth Amendment interpretation,
the dissent insisted that the manner of surveillance was irrelevant
79. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
80. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 209-10.
83. Id. at 214-15.
84. Id. at 212-13 "Curtilage" refers to "any land or building immediately adjacent to a
dwelling, and usually it is enclosed some way by a fence or shrub. For search and seizure
purposes, [it] includes those outbuildings which are directly and intimately connected with
the habitation and in proximity thereto and the land or grounds surrounding the dwelling
which are necessary and convenient and habitually used for family purposes and carrying on
domestic employment." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 384 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
85. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212-13.
86. Id. at 213.
87. Id. at 213-14.
88. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
89. 227 U.S. 438 (1928).
90. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215-16 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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under Katz.91 The dissent found the dispositive inquiry to be
whether society expects the information to remain private.
92
Therefore, the dissent stressed that the focus should be on the
nature of the information itself and not on how it was obtained.
93
Thus, the Ciraolo dissent demonstrates the logical conclusion of
Katz: the actual meaning of the Fourth Amendment is entirely
extraneous. 94
In California v. Greenwood, the Supreme Court employed a
pragmatic hermeneutic to resolve whether a "search" occurs when
the contents of opaque garbage bags that have been placed outside
on the curb for collection are examined.95 The Court split over the
outcome of the pragmatic analysis, however. The majority
maintained that the defendant did not exhibit a subjective
expectation of privacy in this case and society does not expect
trash to remain protected once discarded from the home. 96 The
dissent argued that although the defendant placed his trash on the
curb, the Fourth Amendment nevertheless protected it.97 The
dissent insisted that people would definitely not want others to
inspect their trash because it may contain very intimate details of
their lives.
98
In light of these Supreme Court cases, lower courts have
examined the constitutionality of warrantless thermal imaging. In
summary, the Supreme Court generally employs a pragmatist
91. Id. at 217 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell was joined in dissent by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.
92. Id. at 223 (Powell, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 217 (Powell, J., dissenting). According to a pragmatic hermeneutic, the goal
of the Fourth Amendment is to ensure that citizens "dwell in reasonable security and
freedom from surveillance." Id. (citation omitted). Thus, any law that does not prevent the
government from obtaining information that society would expect to be kept private is a bad
law. The Ciraolo dissent reasoned that "a standard that defines a Fourth Amendment 'search'
by reference to whether police have physically invaded a 'constitutionally protected area!
provides no real protection against surveillance techniques made possible through
technology." Id. at 218 (Powell, J., dissenting). Therefore, the dissent concluded that the
majority's formalist appeal to the history of the Fourth Amendment and the common law
was inappropriate. Id.
94. See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). Decided the same day
as Ciraolo, Dow held that aerial photography of an industrial site, using equipment which
enhanced vision beyond what could be observed by the naked eye, was not a search under
the Fourth Amendment. Dow, 476 U.S. at 237-38. Seeing through walls would be a violation,
however. Id. at 239. The dissent's rationale followed the same lines as the dissent took in
Ciraolo. Id. at 244.
95. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
96. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39-45.
97. Id. at 45-50.
98. Id. at 50.
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hermeneutic, but it occasionally refers to formalist and textualist
tenets.
WARRANTLESS THERMAL IMAGING
The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii set the
tone for the thermal imaging debate in United States v.
Penny-Feeney.99  Suspecting that defendant Penny-Feeney was
growing marijuana in her home, an officer used a forward-looking
infrared device to determine whether the home was expelling an
unusually substantial amount of heat.10 After discussing the results
of the thermal imaging with an expert, the officer concluded that
Penny-Feeney was growing marijuana in her house.101 He obtained
a search warrant, searched the house, and discovered marijuana. 10 2
After a grand jury indictment, Penny-Feeney filed a motion to
suppress the evidence under the exclusionary nile. 1°3
In deciding the motion, the district court applied the Katz
expectation of privacy test.1°4 Characterizing the subject of the
officer's search as "heat waste," the court concluded that
Penny-Feeney exhibited no subjective expectation of privacy.
0 5
Penny-Feeney expected heat to emanate from her house. 1°6 The
court further concluded that Penny-Feeney also failed the objective
expectation test. The court analogized heat waste to the garbage
left on the curb in Greenwood.10 7 Citing several other Supreme
Court cases, the district court held that the use of non-intrusive
technology was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. 08 The
99. 773 F. Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1991).
100. Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. at 222-24.
101. Id. at 224.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 224-25. The exclusionary rule requires the court to suppress the admission
of evidence which was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
104. Id. at 225-26.
105. Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. at 225-26.
106. Id. at 227.
107. Id. at 226. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Greenwood. The district court determined that the heat should be characterized as "heat
waste." Id. at 225. The heat was "an incidental byproduct of various energy sources used to
help cultivate marijuana-" Id. Furthermore, "[diefendants in no way attempted to impede its
escape or assert dominion over it." Id.
108. The district court cited United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); United States
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); and Smith v. Maryland 442 U.S. 735 (1979). Knotts involved
the use of a beeper in a container to keep track of the defendant's movements. Unlike Karo,
the government was able to observe the container visually all the way to its ultimate
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heat waste was not actually communication; rather, it was physical
evidence of a crime. 1°9 The court cited Ciraolo to support its
holding.110 According to Ciraolo, the helicopter's flight over the
house was not a search."' The officer neither trespassed in the
house nor on the curtilage, and did not uncover any intimate
details of the home. 112 Thus, the court concluded that the
warrantless thermal imaging did not qualify as a search under the
Fourth Amendment, and it denied the defendant's motion to
suppress.113
In 1992, the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania addressed the same issue in United States v.
Deaner."4  The court's analysis paralleled the reasoning in
Penny-Feeney by finding that thermal imaging is passive and
non-intrusive. 1 5 Thermal imaging, according to the court, only
detects the amount of heat being expelled." 6 It does not reveal
activities within the home."7 Therefore, the court concluded that
warrantless thermal imaging does not violate the Fourth
Amendment."
8
Since Deaner, three circuits have followed Penny-Feeney's lead,
holding that warrantless thermal imaging does not constitute a
search." 9 In United States v. Pinson, the Eighth Circuit traced the
reasoning in Penny-Feeney, concluding that society does not
expect privacy in heat emanating from a home. 20 In United States
v. Robinson, the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether a defendant's
destination. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280-85.
Place presented the issue of whether a "search" occurred when a dog was used to sniff
personal luggage for drugs. Place, 462 U.S. at 697-98. The Court employed a pragmatist
hermeneutic to conclude that there was no Fourth Amendment search, but it also held the
canine sniff to be sui generis. Id. at 707. Smith related to the constitutionality of using a
pen register. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
109. Id.
110. Id. See supra notes 79-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of Ciraolo.
111. Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. at 227 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213
(1986)).
112. Id. at 227-28.
113. Id. at 228, 230.
114. United States v. Deaner, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13046 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
115. Deaner, 1992 LEXIS at *6.
116. Id. at *11.
117. Id,
118. Id.
119. United Stated v. Pinson, 24 F3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Robinson, 62
F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Myers, 46 E3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995).
120. Pinson, 24 F3d at 1058-59. The court acknowledged that other courts had found
warrantless thermal imaging unconstitutional, but it dismissed these cases with little
explanation. Id. at 1059 n.3.
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inaction with respect to venting heat implied a subjective
expectation of privacy. 121 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that such
inaction does not establish "a subjective expectation of privacy in
this heat emitted from his home."2 2 In considering the objective
component of Katz's expectation of privacy test, the Eleventh
Circuit focused on whether thermal imaging revealed any "intimate
details."123 Noting that thermal imaging does not reveal what is
occurring within the home, but merely indicates the presence of
heat, the court found that society does not expect privacy.2 4
Furthermore, thermal imaging does not intrude into the defendant's
home.25 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that warrantless thermal
imaging does not constitute an unreasonable search. 26 Finally, the
Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Myers, echoed the reasoning of
the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits in analyzing whether warrantless
thermal imaging is a search. 27 The Seventh Circuit also concluded
that it is not.12
8
United States v. Field is the only decision in which a federal
court has ruled against thermal imaging of homes. 12 9 The Field
court attacked the proponents' characterization of thermal imaging
as "passive" to justify its use. 13° The court reasoned that thermal
imaging detects information from a home that otherwise would
121. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1328. The Eleventh Circuit had already held that a person
who intentionally vents heat from his home does not have a subjective expectation of
privacy in that heat. Id. at 1328 (citing United States v. Ford, 34 E3d 992 (11th Cir. 1994)).
122. Robinson, 62 F3d at 1329. The Eleventh Circuit also discussed United States v.
Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995), in which the Fifth Circuit discussed the subjective
component of the expectation of privacy test with respect to warrantless thermal imaging.
Unlike Ishmael, the Eleventh Circuit declined to rely on Ciraolo to justify a finding of a
subjective expectation of privacy. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1329 n.4. The Eleventh Circuit
maintained that Ciraolo was factually and analytically distinct. Id. Ciraolo involved criminal
conduct visible to the naked eye, whereas Robinson involved heat detection by mechanical
devices. Id. Thus, the finding of a subjective expectation of privacy in Ciraolo was
inapplicable to the facts in Robinson. Id.
123. Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1329-30.
124. Id. at 1330.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Myers, 46 F3d at 670-71.
128. Id. at 671. The Seventh Circuit also addressed the technological slippery slope
argument that the court should "limit the use of less sophisticated machines such as the
Agema 210 in order to prevent some future use of more expensive, more technical
equipment that . . . will result in an invasion of privacy." Id. at 671 n. 1. The court said it
would cross that bridge when it came to it. Id.
129. 855 F Supp. 1518 (W.D. Wis. 1994).
130. Field, 855 F. Supp. at 1530.
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remain confidential. 31 The court distinguished Greenwood by
noting that homeowners do not consciously expel heat; but they do
consciously place garbage on the curbside.132 Finally, the Field
court relied upon the technological slippery slope argument. 13 The
court cautioned that advancing technology will eventually reveal
the most intimate details of a person's home; therefore, courts must
check the advance of thermal imaging technology now.'
u
In State v. Young, the Supreme Court of Washington also
criticized Penny-Feeney for describing the expelled heat as
"waste." 35 The court stated that the homeowner does not intend to
expel heat, nor does he expect the government to use sophisticated
technology to measure the amount of heat leaving his house.
36
Furthermore, the canine sniff analogy is inapposite - the United
States Supreme Court had declared it sui generis.137  The
Washington court concluded that the Fourth Amendment does not
permit the police to use sense-enhancing equipment to discover
what they otherwise would not detect through the ordinary
senses. '3
In United States v. Ishmael, the Fifth Circuit addressed whether
warrantless thermal imaging in open fields constituted a Fourth
Amendment "search."139 The Fifth Circuit employed a "balance of
the evidence" approach in concluding that the defendant had a
subjective expectation of privacy. 40 Unlike Myers or Penny-Feeney,
the Fifth Circuit chose to read the Katz subjective prong more
broadly, indicating that a defendant did not need to take every
conceivable precaution to avoid detection.' 4' Concerning the
objective prong of the Katz test, the Fifth Circuit echoed its sister
131. Id. at 1531.
132. Id. at 1532.
133. Id. at 1531.
134. Id.
135. State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 602 (Wash. 1994).
136. Id. at 602-03.
137. Id. at 603. See supra note 108 (referring to Penny-Feeney's reliance on United
States v. Place). "Sui generis" means "[ojf its own kind or class; i.e., the only one of its own
kind; peculiar." BLACK'S LAW DIcIoNARY 1434 (6th ed. 1990).
138. Young, 867 P.2d at 604 (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714 (1984)).
139. United States v. Ishmael, 48 F3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995). In this case, the law
enforcement agent twice used a thermal imaging device on a steel building standing in a
field about 200-300 yards from the defendant's mobile home. The officer detected heat
signatures that thermographers interpreted as indicating that marijuana was being grown.
Ishmael, 48 F3d at 851-52.




circuits by focusing on whether intimate details were discovered.142
The thermal imaging device used in Ishmael did not observe such
details; rather, the court found that it was a "passive, non-intrusive
instrument."'4 In addition, the court found significant the fact that
the law enforcement officer did not intrude into the home or its
curtilage.144 Instead, he merely traversed across an open field to
take his readings.1 45 Since society did not expect privacy in this
situation, the Fifth Circuit held that warrantless thermal imaging is
a constitutional search.
146
Finally, in United States v. Cusumano, a dissenting judge from
the Tenth Circuit articulated a particularly elaborate refutation of
Penny-Feeney and its progeny. 47 The linchpin of the dissent's
argument was its analysis of Katz.'4 The dissent stated that the
"bug" in Katz was conceptually no different from the thermal
imager."9 Both devices passively receive that which is expelled into
the world: in Katz, sound vibrations; in Cusumano, heat
differentials. 50 The Katz Court found that the nature of the
information the government learns is dispositive, rather than the
method of obtaining it.1'5 Agreeing with the Fifth Circuit, the
dissent in Cusumano found that the defendants met the subjective
component because a person should not be expected to stymie
every conceivable technological device in an effort to protect his
privacy. 52 The dissent further argued that, in this case, the
government was obtaining information of a more intimate nature
142. Id. at 855-57.
143. Id. at 855-56.
144. Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 856-57.
145. Id. at 857.
146. Id. The Fifth Circuit held, "the DEAs warrantless use of a thermal imager in this
case was not an unconstitutional search." Id.
147. 83 F.3d 1247, 1251-66 (10th Cir. 1996) (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). In this case, the majority declined to address the issue of warrantless thermal
imaging. Id. at 1251. The dissent disagreed, maintaining that this was not a situation in
which "prudential discretion" required the court to abstain from addressing the issue; hence,
the dissent argued that warrantless thermal imaging was an unconstitutional search. Id. at
1252-53.
148. Id. at 1255.
149. Id. at 1256-58.
150. Id. at 1257-58.
151. Id. at 1257. The Cusumano court found, "The Supreme Court in Katz did not
dwell on upon these physical minutiae, but, rather, recognized that the Fourth Amendment
broadly protects from government intrusion that which a person reasonably seeks to keep
private." Id.
152. Cusumano, 83 F3d at 1259 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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than the other courts realized.153 Thus, the dissent cautioned that as
technology advances, the details of a person's home life will be
obtainable from thermal imaging.M  A person's substantial
expectation of privacy in the home encompasses its heat
signatures. 155
The Cusumano dissent cited United States v. Karo in support of
its position that thermal imaging already revealed too much detail
about the home. 15 In Karo, the government conducted an
unconstitutional search by monitoring a beeper hidden inside a
drum to ascertain the drum's location.157 The monitoring revealed
that the drum was located in a private residence.M Thus, "the
revelation of a single detail about the interior of the home -
whether or not the beeper was still inside the home - sufficed to
violate the Fourth Amendment."' 59 The Cusumano dissent reasoned
that thermal imaging reveals equally significant details about one's
home; therefore, it, too, should be prohibited without a warrant.16°
Furthermore, the dissent in Cusumano distinguished warrantless
thermal imaging from the cases relied upon by Penny-Feeney and
its progeny.161 Greenwood rests upon two propositions: that the
trash is relinquished voluntarily, and that people frequently dig
through trash.'62 Heat, on the other hand, is not something that is
voluntarily relinquished.16
The dissent also argued that reliance on United States v. Place
was inappropriate.'T 6 The dog sniff is much more precise than the
thermal imager; the dog detects only narcotics, whereas the
thermal imager detects "a vast array of innocent conduct." 16
Additionally, the dissent pointed out that the dog sniff is sui
generis; thus, it should not be applied to thermal imaging.'TM
153. Id. at 1261.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1263.
157. Cusumano, 83 F3d at 1263 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1264.
161. Id.
162. Cusumano, 83 F.3d at 1264 (McKay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
163. Id. at 1264. The dissent stated, "An individual no more chooses to have his or her
home emit infrared radiation than he or she chooses to absorb or reflect visible light, but we
have never heard the process of sight described in terms of abandoned photons." Id.





The Cusumano dissent concluded by citing the danger of
technological advances: "the protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment are most crucial when technological advances give the
government access to the private affairs within the homes of
American citizens."167 Thus, the dissent stated that it would hold
warrantless thermal imaging an unconstitutional "search."168
CONCLUSION
The question was posed in the introduction: why do these lower
courts come to differing conclusions on whether the Fourth
Amendment prohibits warrantless thermal imaging? The answer lies
in the hermeneutic employed by these courts. All of the lower
courts employed Katz's pragmatism. Consequently, the language of
the text of the Fourth Amendment was hardly considered in
evaluating warrantless thermal imaging. Rather, the courts focused
on the effect of warrantless thermal imaging in light of the search
and seizure clause. The proponents of warrantless thermal imaging
reasoned that it would not reveal intimate details, nor would it
intrude on the defendant's property. The opponents of warrantless
thermal imaging countered that it would reveal intimate details
about the home and, furthermore, would open the door to more
intrusive technology.
This conflict reveals two things. First, the proponents did not
consistently apply pragmatism. They relied upon several Supreme
Court cases that, in turn, relied upon the curtilage doctrine. The
curtilage doctrine arose out of the formalist method. Thus, in
conducting their analyses, the proponents considered the manner
in which the information was obtained, as opposed to considering
the nature of the information alone. Therefore, these courts
emphasized the fact that thermal imaging is a passive, non-intrusive
instrument which merely records a waste product. This emphasis is
at odds with Katz's pragmatism, which held that the only relevant
consideration is the nature of the information obtained. Katz was
not concerned with how the information was obtained; rather, it
only considered expectations of privacy.
Second, this conflict reveals two essential attributes of legal
pragmatism: autonomy and subjectivism. According to legal
pragmatism, the judiciary's function is to weigh social values. The




weighing of social values determines the objective that the judiciary
must then achieve. The objective to be achieved determines the
law; that is, the law is the instrument by which the judiciary
obtains the objective. Therefore, the judiciary's function is to
determine the law. If the judiciary determines the law, then it is
greater than the law. Hence, the judiciary is autonomous: it is a law
(nomos) unto itself (autos).'6
Legal pragmatism is also inherently subjective. With no objective
text to determine the boundaries of the law, courts are expected to
disagree when weighing such values as society's interest in privacy
against the government's interest in law enforcement. The only
force tending to create uniformity among the lower courts is the
United States Supreme Court. Since the Supreme Court employs
pragmatism, a subjective hermeneutic, the lower courts can do no
more than speculate about the Supreme Court's holding on the
permissibility of warrantless thermal imaging.
While other interpretive methodologies are not free of autonomy
and subjectivity, arguably, they can provide a greater degree of
objectivity. Textualism, for instance, would be more likely to result
in consistency on the issue of warrantless thermal imaging. In
examining the Fourth Amendment, a court would find that the
concept of a search was very concrete and tangible. 170 As Justice
Black wrote, "[E]ven where there was a trespass the Fourth
Amendment does not automatically apply to evidence obtained by
'hearing or sight.' "171 A court would consider whether one can even
obtain a warrant for measuring heat in the future. How can one
know whether it will be there? How does one describe the heat to
be searched? 172 The court, applying a textualist hermeneutic, would
likely conclude that, plainly, thermal imaging is not a search.
Arguably, such textualism would achieve greater consistency in the
courts. The burden would then fall upon legislatures to protect
individuals in their homes from warrantless thermal imaging and
other future technology.
Textualism would also provide a means by which the judiciary
could limit its autonomy and submit to a law greater than itself.
Instead of identifying social objectives and weighing competing
169. As a practical matter, of course, the executive and legislative branches do
counter-balance the law-making power of the judicial branch to a degree.
170. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 365 (Black, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 368-69 (Black, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
172. See id. at 365 (Black, J., dissenting) (Justice Black inquired, "how can a magistrate
issue a warrant to eavesdrop [on] one in the future?"). Id.
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interests, the judiciary would seek the law in the text of the
Constitution. Of course, such a pursuit assumes that a court can
understand the fair import of the words in context.173 This being
assumed, a court must then restrain itself to declaring the law to
be no more or less than what the text communicates it to be.
In summary, there are two questions: whether the judiciary
should be autonomous and whether the judiciary should determine
the law on a subjective, ad hoc basis. If the answer to these two
questions is in the affirmative, then the judiciary should continue
with its pragmatic hermeneutic. If the answer is in the negative,
then the judiciary should adopt a textualist hermeneutic. Who,
however, answers these questions is another matter, not to be
addressed here. Thus, the issue of warrantless thermal imaging
reveals the critical importance of constitutional hermeneutics.
Todd M. Higey
173. This issue is hotly debated in academic circles. See, e.g., LEvINSON, supra note 14;
WoLE, supra note 17; ScALA, supra note 17; BoRI, supra note 24.
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